This paper presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between patenting, innovation, and federal antitrust enforcement towards firms in the manufacturing sector. I examine whether the likelihood of antitrust litigation is influenced by patent histories and R&D expenditures, after controlling for other firm-specific variables including size and likelihood of antitrust charges for medium and large firms. Smaller firms with faster sales growth are also more likely to be charged with antitrust violations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The American judiciary in the nineteenth century deprecated monopoly, but celebrated the grant of property rights in patents.1 Judges did not recognize patents as monopolies, arguing that patentees added to social welfare through innovations which had never existed before, whereas monopolists secured to themselves rights that already belong to the public. 2 The passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 was associated with a populist emphasis on the need to protect the public from corporate monopolies, including those based on patent protection.3 Numerous lawsuits, articles and books since then have debated whether antitrust policies, which are designed to suppress monopolization, are antithetical to policies that grant exclusive property rights in inventions.
Researchers who support the hypothesis of a conflict typically describe antitrust lawsuits and identify the large number which seem to hinge on patent issues or to involve corporations regarded as technological leaders. The roster ranges from landmark cases in Proponents of the "no conflict" view specify distinctions between the justifiable exercise of patent power and unjustifiable misuse that is subject to antitrust action; countercite other cases upholding patent rights in the context of antitrust charges; or else point to the lack of supporting evidence.7 Ward Bowman refuted the notion of a conflict on conceptual grounds, arguing that the objective of both policies is to increase social welfare by providing consumers with the most goods at the lowest cost.8 Federal antitrust agencies have likewise contended that there is 'no basic incompatibility or irreconciliable conflict between the patent laws and the antitrust laws," because both have the objective of promoting competition and enhancing social utility.9 The question of conflict is easy to dismiss in specific circumstances such as patent misuse and fraud. For instance, in Pfizer v. FTC 394 U.S. 920 (1969) , it was found that Pfizer and American Cyanamid had deceived the Patent Office and used the patent property to engage in monopolization of the tetracycline market. Similarly, the FTC challenged a 1998 merger between Summit
Technologies and VISX because of patent misuse, and proposed that a key VISX patent should be overturned.'0 Plaintiffs in antitrust disputes can also bring charges based on 'predatory innovation" that has the objective of eliminating competition." However, such cases involve clearly unacceptable practices associated with patent ownership, and do not bear on questions such as whether technological innovators may legitimately gain market power associated with patent ownership, and thus increase the likelihood that complaints against them are filed under antitrust laws.
This study considers the question of whether greater technological innovativeness is associated with closer scrutiny by antitrust enforcement agencies. Specifically, I examine whether technological innovation influences the probability of an antitrust action. Case studies and theoretical insights are important and informative, but the issue of the relationship between patent and antitrust enforcement is only partially illuminated by these 3 methods. Although quantitative data are likely to exhibit other limitations, a systematic assessment of antitrust charges over time at least provides another perspective that may shed some light on the patent-antitrust debate. Despite the voluminous literature on antitrust litigation and its relationship to intellectual property, most empirical work has been directed towards other antitrust issues and few towards the patent-antitrust interface.
Richard Posner made an important contribution in 1970 when he presented simple descriptive statistics regarding overall historical trends in antitrust enforcement at the industry level. Some researchers have used his industry level data to examine the determinants of antitrust activity, and, apart from sales, found a negligible relationship between economic factors and numbers of charges brought across industries.'2 This is hardly surprising, since antitrust charges are brought against firms, and not against industries. Other studies have analyzed specific antitrust violations such as price fixing and mergers, or on the political economy of federal agencies such as the FTC. '3 This paper therefore presents an empirical analysis of the patent-antitrust issue in the manufacturing sector between 1970 and 1998. I investigate the influence of innovation on the likelihood of federal government antitrust charges, controlling for firm specific factors such as firm size, sales growth and advertising intensity. It should be noted that the underlying concern is not so much to ascertain whether there is an inherent or actual patent-antitrust conflict. Rather, this study recasts the debate by considering whether innovative firms that engage in high levels of patenting or research and development antitrust are more likely to be engaged in federal antitrust litigation. I also assess an example, in the area of R&D joint ventures, where antitrust policy appears to have 4 influenced the rate and direction of inventive activity.
The first section of the paper summarizes aggregate trends in antitrust litigation initiated by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice between 1970 and 1998. The second section describes a dataset of firms that were involved in federal restraint of trade lawsuits and a control sample that form the basis for subsequent analysis.
The third section examines patterns of patenting and innovation at the firm level, and relates these patterns to variation over time, firm characteristics, and interindustry effects.
The data are then used to assess whether innovativeness in the form of R&D and patenting tends to increase the likelihood of antitrust charges within a given industry, after controlling for other variables that might affect the tendency to antitrust scrutiny. The final section discusses whether antitrust policy has influenced firm behaviour, by considering patterns of filing of joint ventures in research and development, under the National Cooperative Research and Production Act which provides limited relief from antitrust sanctions.
Clearly, if finns with more extensive patent portfolios experience a greater likelihood of antitrust scrutiny, it holds serious implications for the future of the patent system. Significantly, sanctions under the patent law are far less stringent than those of antitrust: patentees who are charged under antitrust law may face treble damages, forced divestures and compulsory licensing, compared to the simple invalidation of the patent grant under patent laws. Thus, if firms perceive that higher patenting is associated with a higher likelihood of antitrust charges, a rational response would be to reduce the propensity to patent, and to attempt to appropriate returns outside of the patent system. It should be noted that this study is not intended to prescribe whether optimal policy should be directed 5 towards strengthening antitrust enforcement or towards furthering the rights of patent holders. However, legal rules are unlikely to be wealth-maximizing if they create inconsistent incentives, so the results bear implications for both federal industrial and intellectual property policies.
II. AGGREGATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND THE ANTITRUST DATASET
The major antitrust statutes --the Sherman Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Clayton Act, Hart-Scott-Rodino Act --have the basic objective of regulating business and controlling firms which engage in anticompetitive practives, in order to promote social welfare. Figure   1 shows all antitrust cases, both federal and private, filed in U.S. district courts between 1975 and 1997. Both series reveal a precipitous drop in total district court filings, but the share of government lawsuits increased somewhat after 1985, partly because of more stringent requirements that the courts imposed on private litigants. I chose to focus on federal government litigation in this study, because the rationale for private antitrust litigation is likely to be more difficult to disentangle and interpret. Moreover, private actions may be related to government charges, as in cases where private plaintiffs use federal complaints as a signal to free-ride on federal investigation expenditures and to try to obtain damages or injunctive relief from alleged harm that the federal defendant may Figure 2 illustrates the time series of federal antitrust complaints that I compiled as a subset of the aggregate data described above. The antitrust sample totals approximately 500 companies involved in 547 cases, and excludes those charged with "noneconomic" antitrust torts such as deceptive advertising and misleading trade practices. This number was reduced to 426 actions against publicly traded firms that were included in the Compustat files, in order to obtain a time series of financial data such as income, balance sheet and stock market values. The antitrust charge specified the product market that was the subject of the action, so it was possible to allocate each charge to an industry at the four-digit SIC level. Each firm in the antitrust sample was then matched by 4-digit SIC code and the year in which the lawsuit was filed with a control firm that had not been involved in antitrust litigation between 1950 and 1998 (see Appendix). Table 1 are consistent with other studies using patent data and are consistent with the 'Schumpeterian hypothesis." The data indicate that patenting varies positively with firm size in the antitrust sample as well as the control sample. Patenting by antitrust firms is significantly higher across all size categories, both in terms of levels and relative to total assets and sales. However, the summary statistics in Table 1 also indicate that the antitrust firms tend to be much larger than the control sample. This reflects the significance of large size (and hence of market share) in motivating antitrust lawsuits: in some concentrated industries (such as automobiles and rubber tires) it was difficult to find any firms which had existed in the same period and had not been charged with antitrust violations after 1950. However, one might be concerned about selection bias in the control sample. In order to indicate how sensitive the results are to differences in size the analysis reported below allows coefficients to vary across firm size. I also tested the robustness of the results by redoing the analysis after eliminating from the dataset the top 100 firms in terms of size. The smaller antitrust firms have a greater patenting intensity relative to total assets and to research and development than the larger antitrust firms. Both large and medium antitrust firms tend to have higher research and development and advertising expenditures relative to total assets and sales compared to the control sample, whereas smaller firms in both samples were more similar in these dimensions. Medium and small firms also reported similar physical capital intensity across samples, but the antitrust firms are characterized by higher levels of intangible assets relative to total assets, have higher sales growth, and greater profitability. The control firms tended to have lower excess market valuations (ratios of market value of the firm to total assets that proxy for Tobin's Q), which may be interpreted as a crude measure indicating lower market power. The record of higher intellectual property litigation for antitrust firms is somewhat ambiguous, since it may reflect higher valued patents, or greater competitiveness in defending or enforcing the firm's intellectual property. The latter might be related to anticompetitive strategies, but the negligible simple correlation (Table 2 ) between the proxy for market power and litigation does not support the idea that intellectual property litigation is related to market dominance. Figure 3 is consistent with the idea that antitrust firms are more innovative with regard to patenting compared to the general population of firms, since their record of average annual patent grants is consistently higher. Although there is still a lot of noise in the time series of average annual patents granted, a declining trend was followed by a recent surge in patents granted to antitrust firms charged in the 1990s. This could be due to the increase in the importance of technology-intensive industries relative to total economic Notes: The horizontal axis refers to the year in which the antitrust charge was filed, and the data series reflect the log of total patents granted to firms in each sample. For further information on the samples, see the text.
-Antitrust -0-Matched output, or to greater antitrust attention being paid to firms or industries that are more innovative. The former hypothesis seems more plausible since the matched sample experiences similar patterns in patenting. Because firms are matched by industry, these data reveal within industry variation in antitrust activity rather than intermdustry differences. However, Table 3 indicates an increase in the number of firms charged with antitrust violations in the chemical, pharmaceutical, computer and machinery, and professional and scientific equipment industries, industries which are generally regarded as more technologically innovative. In order to explore the relationship between patenting and antitrust, it is useful to further examine the factors that influence patenting at the firm level. Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions with the log of the five year patent stock as the dependent variable. Patenting shows a downward trend, and is significantly higher for larger firms and for firms that were involved in antitrust. However, apart from size, none of the market power variables is significant. Separate regressions for firms of small, medium and large size (not reported) indicate that much of the patenting by smaller firms appears to be non-firm specific, for only 10 percent of variation in their patenting is explained by the independent variables, compared to 55-66 percent for medium firms.
Higher research and development is associated with higher patenting, with significantly positive coefficients on current R&D and the second R&D lagged term (although the significance of the second term falls when total assets is included), suggesting that patents in these firms may tend to arise early in the development stage. The relationship between patenting and R&D appears to be non-linear, since the coefficient on the squared R&D term is positive and significant. However, the latter result does not hold when the 
(2) regression is estimated over antitrust firms alone. It is interesting that the R&D coefficients are more important for the control sample, probably due to greater variation across the non-antitrust firms unobserved by measurement error.
As is generally found, firms in the chemical, metal, automobile, computer and communications, and professional equipment industries experience higher patenting relative to those in traditional industries such as lumber, paper products, food and textiles, but industry effects do not add much explanatory power to the equation. The second part of the table reports regressions that allow coefficients to vary across both samples. As suggested by the simple statistics, the total assets or firm size elasticity of patenting is twice as high for the antitrust firms. Interindustry differences in patenting are evident across the samples, since companies in the control sample operating in the petroleum, automobile, computer and communications, chemical and pharmaceutical industries are not particularly prolific in terms of patent ownership. In sum, these results are consistent with the idea that antitrust firms tend to be larger and more innovative than other members of their industry who were not the subject of antitrust charges. The next section considers whether the likelihood of antitrust litigation varies with the degree of innovation.
IV. ANTITRUST AND INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Previous sections presented data and cases that indicate an increase over time in the importance of federal government antitrust charges relative to private cases. The recent attention of federal agencies to high technology firms also raised the possibility that the significance of patent/antitrust issues has increased since 1970. An examination of simple 13 statistics on patenting seems to suggest that firms with higher patenting records are more likely to face charges of violating antitrust laws. However, these findings did not control for other factors that might influence antitrust litigation, such as profitability, advertising, and size of the firm. Therefore, in this section I use the firm level dataset described above to present multivariate analyses of factors that may influence the probability that a corporation will be involved in antitrust litigation. The major hypothesis being tested is whether firms with higher patenting profiles are more likely to experience antitrust litigation after controlling for other factors that might influence antitrust scrutiny.
Official reports by the federal antitrust agencies correctly point out that firms have rarely been charged directly with antitrust violations based on patent issues. However, the pattern in Figure 4 suggests that the issue is worth exploring further. The data were obtained from a search of the Lexis-Nexis federal lawsuits files (GENFED/OMNI) and include both private and federal government antitrust cases. I selected all lawsuits in which the words patent and antitrust occurred at least six times as an index of patent-antitrust cases, and computed the ratio of this index to all cases in which "antitrust" appeared at least six times (the patterns are not especially sensitive to the frequency chosen). The figure suggests that there was a decline in the importance of patent and antitrust issues until the middle of the 1970s, and a sharp increase thereafter until at least 1993. This is consistent with the fact that, at the same time that patent legislation guarded the rights of patentees against infringing competitors, a number of landmark restraint of trade lawsuits that involved technological innovators were being brought in these years.27 Table 5 reports logit regressions that were estimated first across all finns, then by The regressions also attempt to control for the influence of intangible assets and of market power through a number of proxies. Capital intensity and accounting measures of intangible assets were not influential, and thus are not included in the reported regression.
A standard proxy is advertising expenditures, which are positively related to the likelihood of antitrust charges. Firms with faster growth in sales are also more likely to be the subject of antitrust investigations. Rapid sales growth and excess market value may signal the presence of market power through innovation or in the form of rents to firm-specific assets.
The results indicate that firms with higher sales growth and excess market values are more likely to be involved in antitrust, although the inclusion of both variables reduces the overall explanatory power of the regression.
The relationship between antitrust and innovation might vary depending on interactions between independent variables and firm size, but inclusion of interaction terms reduces the reliability of estimates because of collinearity. The second section of the table therefore shows separate regressions for smaller firms (those with real total assets below $500 million) and medium firms (assets between $500 million and $1000 million). Similar patterns to those reported above hold for medium firms, except for the lack of influence of sales growth on the likelihood of antitrust charges. Patenting by smaller firms is not related to antitrust involvement (although this result only holds for a subset of this class).30
Advertising intensity is also not influential, but smaller firms with faster sales growth or higher excess market values are more likely to attract antitrust attention.
If it is indeed true that innovative or successful enterprises face a higher likelihood of antitrust litigation, one might expect that such firms would respond by changing the rate and direction of their inventive activity. This is a difficult issue to determine empirically, but some evidence is available in the area of R&D alliances. Thus, the next section provides The responsiveness of innovative firms to a statute that in effect only offers protection from treble damages seems to suggest an extremely high perceived probability of charges and conviction incident on participation in joint ventures. The number of filings with the DOJ is therefore consistent with the idea that businesses perceive some degree of conflict between antitrust and innovation. sharing and access to other markets. However, these are reasons for engaging in shared endeavours rather than for registration with the federal antitrust agencies. It is possible to gain some insight into the link between antitrust enforcement and the tendency to register joint R&D activities by considering the antitrust history of member firms. I therefore analyzed the federal antitrust records of a random sample of member firms that filed under the NCRPA. As Table 6 28. It might seem plausible to use a direct measure of market share; however market share data are likely to be of limited use since the data would require information on the share of firm's sales in the antitrust market, whereas most firms operate in several markets, and separate data are not available for the firm's sales in each market.
29. This result might valy depending on interactions between patenting and firm size, but inclusion of interaction terms reduces the reliability of the estimates because of collinearity.
Intellectual property litigation was also significantly associated with higher antitrust litigation, but was excluded from the reported equations because litigation was coffinear with the patent stock. 
